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Laurence W. Wood
Contemporary forms of atheism among analytic philosophers are rooted
largely in the skeptical writings of David Hume and his empiricism.
During the Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, Hume recom
mended that any claims to knowledge aEout the world, God and the self
which were not Eased on sensory e[perience should Ee committed to the
flames
 This attack on traditional metaphysics was intended to destroy the
foundation for the proofs for God
s e[istence.
Hume
s empiricism formed the Easis for the rise of a new philosophy
known first as logical positivism and later called logical empiricism. It first
emerged during the years following World War I from a group of e[-scien
tists turned philosophers who were located in 9ienna, Austria. The influ
ence of these e[-scientistsphilosophers Tuickly spread throughout Britain
and America, primarily through the writings of A. @. Ayer and Rudolf
Carnap.

Their methods limited the scope of philosophy to logical analysis. More
specifically, philosophy was defined strictly as the logic of science. Only
empirical statements supported Ey the scientific method could form the
Easis for meaningful, factual statements. This meant the reMection of tradi
tional theism in particular Eecause it could not Ee confirmed or discon-
firmed Ey appealing directly to sensory e[perience. Ayer called this sensory
test of truth the verification principle.A
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It is now well known that logical enApiricism self-destructed. )or it Eecame
oEvious that the verification principle itself was self-contradictory Eecause it
could neither Ee confirmed nor disconfirmed as a theory it was not suEMect to
sensory e[perience. To Ee sure, the logical empiricists recogni]ed this difficulty
Ey inconsistently allowing for an e[ception to their own premise.
 It also
destroyed the Easis for ethical theory, reducing all moral Mudgements to mere
sentiment. The logical empiricist
s claim that all ethics is a matter of mere emo
tion is an aEsolute ethical Mudgment itself and can for that very reason Ee dis
missed as mere emotion according to its own principle.
These two difficulties in themselves were enough to make the logical empiri
cist
s criterion of truth proElematic, Eut the fatal flaw to logical empiricism was
e[posed when it was reali]ed that Eoth science and history were also under
mined, since Eoth disciplines made statements aEout things which could not Ee
directly e[perienced. After all, the mission of logical empiricism was to free the
world of pretentious metaphysics, superstition, and religious Eeliefs. Its simulta
neous and unintended destruction of scientific and historical knowledge was too
much. Australian philosopher John Passmore notes: Throw metaphysics into
the fire, and science goes with it, preserve science from the flames and meta
physics comes creeping Eack.
Empiricist J. L. Mackie reMected logical positivism Eecause, this theory of
meaning is itself highly implausiEle. It is well known that the adoption of it
would similarly create serious difficulties for the meaning of many ordinary
statements, including all those aEout past, historical events, or aEout the minds,
thoughts and feelings of persons other than oneself.A
Though philosophically logical empiricism self-destructed, it continues in a
modified form today among many Anglo-American philosophers as a Easis for
refuting traditional theism. The atheism of I. L. Mackie is typical. He was a read
er in Philosophy at O[ford University and fellow of University College, O[ford,
prior to his death in 9. Our purpose here will Ee to e[amine some of the criti
cal points raised against traditional theism. Special attention will Ee given to
Mackie. A careful consideration of his atheistic perspective is deserving for at
least three reasons.
)irst, J. L. Mackie is considered Ey many as representative of the most persua
sive form of atheism found in Anglo-American philosophy. Toward the end of
his life, Mackie developed his most complete statement on religious atheism in
his Eook. The Miracle of Theism, which was puElished posthumously. Kai Nielsen,
who is also one of the most articulate atheists in this century, says that this Eook
is one of the most, proEaEly the most, distinguished articulation of an atheistic
point of view given in the twentieth century.
Second, his thinking is mainly rooted in the arguments of David Hume, who is the
patron saint of most contemporary Anglo-American atheists. We will thus engage the
thinking of Eoth Hume and Mackie in assessuig the evidence for Eehef in God.
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Third, Mackie e[tends the thinking of the skeptical David Hume into a full
Elown atheism. David Hume nowhere directly emEraced atheism. The Erunt of
his attack was largely upon the dogmatic proofs for God
s e[istence widely
assumed in the deistic thinking of his time. He also attacked the foundation of
Christian faith in miracles. Hume at least allowed for the possiEle e[istence of
God Eased upon the design argument, and he was outraged with the dogmatic
atheism of the )rench materialists.
 Mackie transforms the skepticism of Hume
into a dogmatic form of atheism. Whereas Hume said that the claims for
Christian faith cannot Ee reasonaEly supported in matters of fact, Mackie says
any concept of God cannot Ee reasonaEly supported. Whereas Hume said
Christian faith is a miracle in the peMorative sense᪽that no right-thinking per
son should Ee aEle to emErace it Eecause of insufficient evidence, Mackie
e[tends this argument to include any claim for Eelief in God. Hence the title of
Mackie
 s Eook. The Miracle of Theism. I shall argue, in contrast, that atheism is a
miracle in Hume
s sense of Eeing irrational Eecause the evidence for Eelief in
God is there for anyone who wills to know it.
One further comment aEout the importance of considering Mackie
s defense
of atheism. Michael Novak oEserves that the maMority of intellectual people,
especially scientists, artists, and professors in the United States, are atheists.

Christian theists are morally oEligated to consider and understand the reasons
why thoughtful people emErace atheism if they are to engage in meaningful dia
logue with current thinking.
IS GOD-TALK INTELLIGIBLE"
Unlike some contemporary atheists, Mackie affirms the intelligiEility of the
traditional concept of God᪽as a personal Eeing who is transcendent, creator of
all things, free to act with intention, omnipotent omniscient, perfect in goodness
and worthy of worship. He thinks that the contemporary theistic philosopher,
Richard SwinEurne, has shown that the logic of traditional religious language is
uneTuivocal, unamEiguous and perfectly clear. Nonetheless, Mackie rightly
points out that logical coherence is not in itself convincing evidence.
SwinEurne likewise affirms the same point. Whether or not God really e[ists is
not determined simply Ey the Tuestion of the logic of religious language. Of
course, if religious language is incoherent then it hardly could Ee affirmed that
God actually e[ists. But the coherence of theistic language and the actuahty of
God
s e[istence are logically distinct Tuestions.
A
Mackie understandaEly e[cludes any discussion of non-traditional theists.
This neglect is not appreciated especially Ey process theologians. Daniel Day
Williams complains that philosophical critics of theism snuE process theology.
He writes: The entire discussion aEout rehgious language has gone on as if the
only conception of God which can Ee offered is that of traditional Christian the
ism especially in the form it takes in Anglican orthodo[y.

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Mackie clearly e[plains the reason for this omission in his reference to process
theologian, Paul Tillich. If the concept of God e[cludes the notion of personality
and self-consciousness, then such talk aEout God is so watered down as to Ee
not only indisputaEle Eut uninteresting. If God is simply whatever you care
most aEout, then not even St. Anselm
s fool will deny that God e[ists. But so
easy a victory is not worth winning.

 Only if a definition of God includes the
idea of self-consciousness is it worth deEating.
IS GOD-TALK SENSIBLE"
Granted that the main affirmations of theism are coherent, Mackie Eeheved
that only arguments rooted in sensory e[perience will decide the truthfulness of
traditional theism.
 He reMected the earlier logical positivism and emEraced a
weak verificationist view, that all our terms have to Ee given meaning Ey their
use is some statements that are verifiaEle or confirmaEle in our e[perience.
A
This weakened form of logical empiricism still assumes that all knowledge is
rooted in ordinary sensory e[perience. )or e[ample, even if we cannot verify the
statement, It was raining an hour ago, Mackie says we still can accept it as a
meaningful statement since it is grounded in ordinary sensory e[perience.

Mackie
s weakened version of the verificationist theory of meaning still
e[cludes the possiEility that God e[ists unless God is known to us directly
through our sensory e[perience. Unless one can physically see, hear, smell,
touch, or taste directly for oneself the evidence for the reality of God, then we
have no rational Easis for Eelieving. This is why one contemporary atheisL Kai
Nielsen, frankly says only an anthropomorphic theism is rationally coherent,
while the developed concept of God in Judeo-Christian tradition is incoherent.


Why" Because the God of Christian theology transcends the world and is not lit
erally another finite Eeing alongside other Eeings in the world. Because of this,
God cannot Ee literally sensed God is Spirit John 4:24, not an oEMect capaEle of
Eeing put inside a scientific laEoratory. Since he cannot thus Ee verified in our
sensory or sensiEle e[perience, not even a weak verificationist theory of mean
ing will allow that he could possiEly e[ist. It is apparent that Mackie and
Nielsen is still shackled Ey the earlier logical empiricism which assumed that all
statements of fact must Ee verified through our own five senses. It is thus diffi
cult, if not unintelligiEle, to take Mackie seriously when he concedes that tra
ditional religious language is coherent.
It is understandaEle that Mackie e[cludes historical revelations, tradition and
common certainties as Eases for Eelief considering his Humean empiricism.
 He
thus gives consideraEle attention to the traditional philosophical arguments for
God
s e[istence᪽the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral argu
ments. The focus of our attention, however, will not Ee upon his critiTue of these
arguments. As insightful and convincing as the philosophical theistic arguments
are, as numerous contemporary philosophers of religion have demonstrated
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iMascall, Hick, SAsinEume, Kiing, Plantinga, PannenEerg, and despite Mackie
s
negative evaluation of them, we will not focus upon them Eecause they are not
the fundamental reasons for Eehe?ang in the God of Christian faith. Besides, his
weak verificationist theory of meaning has already e[cluded the success of these
argrunents even Eefore he e[amines them. His epistemic presupposition really
makes the e[tensive argumentation in his treatise altogether unnecessary-. The
possiEility of proAAJlg God has Eeen eliminated even Eefore the argumentation
has Eegun )or God is not a sensiEle fact, i.e., not an oEser?
aEle fact through our
five senses.
Mackie
s verificationist theory deseryAes at least two other criticisms. )irst, his
weakened version of logical empiricism is self-refuting. Like the logical empiri
cists, he insists that factual statements must Ee verifiaEle or confirmaEle in our
e[perience.-
 This theory may Ee logically coherent as an aEstract idea, Eut Avho
has ever sensed it" That is, you can
t touch, feel, taste, hear or smell this theorAA
Yet the theor`
 reTuires that any claim to truth must Ee sensed What is surpris
ing is that Mackie does not even consider this self-contradiction which often was
made against the logical empiricists.
The famous British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, also emEraced Humean
empiricism. He acknowledged this dilemma. He recogni]ed that this theory of
sensory- e[perience as the Easis for all claims to knowledge could not Ee rational
ly resolved, Eut nonetheless said that it was a MustifiaEle h?-pothesis since it Avas
foundational to knowing Russell thus interpreted this sensory, inductive
approach to all knoAving as a logically independent principle ?vhich cannot Ee
derived from sensory e[perience itself.- This is a fancy Avay of saA-ing that since
everyEody reUes on their own sense e[periences and we all come up wdth essen-
tiall?- the same opinions, then it is okay to take it on faith that it is a true theory
In terms of scientific discovery and ordinary- kno-yvledge of physical things, we
do reTuire sensory- e[perience. But this is hardly Mustification for restricting aU
possiEle knowledge to what can Ee sensed. Even contemporary- philosophy of
science shows that natural science is as dependent on intuiti?-e thinking as it is
upon empirical e[perience. This ?Aerificationist theory is self-refuting and ought
to Ee committed to the flames, as Hume unwittingly encouraged others to do
with traditional metaph?-sics without reali]ing that his Mudgment apphed to his
own theory- as well. Only if there is a personal, infinite Reason -yvhich accounts
for the e[istence of our finite reason is it philosophically MustifiaEle to trust our
sensory e[periences. To depend upon finite reason is impHdtly to depend upon
a larger, more universal, self-e[istent Reason Avhich is the reason why anything
e[ists. The alternative is nihihsm, which Eoth Hume and Mackie reMect. Hence, if
Ave finally have to admit, as RusseU did, that a Humean theory- of knowledge is
Eased on a con?-iction which is not suEMect to its o?sti rational demands, then we
ine?ataEly mo?
e Eack to Hume
s skepticism. Mackie reMected skepticism, Eut to
adopt Hume
s empiricism without his skepticism is sheer dogmatism.
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A second issue which must Ee Eroached immediately is this Tuestion: Does
faith in God depend upon our argumentation or upon God
s self-revelation"
This Tuestion will Ee addressed later on, Eut for now it should Ee acknowledged
that the traditional Eelief in the EiElical God did not come aEout originally
through rational, philosophical reflection. If God e[ists, his reality is determined
for us Ey his own initiative. Mackie assumes that human rationality alone must
decide the issue of God
s e[istence. Christian theology, in contrast, has devel
oped its rational understanding of God
s e[istence in the light of his self-disclo
sure in history. Paul argues that God showed himself in the fullness of time
Galatians 4:4᪽Ey which he means that when the human race had reached a
mature point when it could appreciate and understand God
s true nature, then
God introduced himself personally and fully. Out of God
s self-introduction.
Christian theology was then aEle to construct a rationaltheological understand
ing through reflecting on the meaning of this divine disclosure. To take seriously
Christian Eelief in God should reTuire that one e[amine in detail the main rea
son why Christians Eelieve in God, namely the history of revelation. Mackie
s
almost e[clusive focus on rational argumentation Eased on his verificationist
theory of truth ignores the original reason why Christians Eelieve.
IS GOD-TALK RATIONAL"
Mackie Eelieves deductive and non-deductive arguments will determine the
Tuestion of God
s e[istence.
A He points out there is an a priori, deductive ele
ment in all thinking, Eut he gives priority to the a posteriori, non-deductive ele
ment. More pointedly, there must Ee clear evidence of an empirical kind to con
vince the thoughtful person today that God e[ists.
Many of Mackie
s epistemic considerations are surely on target. It is insuffi
cient for faith to Ee grounded simply on itself. Otherwise faith degenerates into
superstition. Theistic claims thus cannot Ee e[empted from a critical e[amination
of the evidence. In fact, the modern demand for critical reflection on the nature
of truth is the product of Christian theology itselL Christian faith would not Ee
true to itself if it reMected critical thinking.
Mackie
s too Erief dismissal of the rational claims of a historical revelation of
God in Jesus may Ee in part Eecause he already had adopted Hume
s attitude
aEout causal reasoning. It is highly interesting, not to say parado[ical or even
contradictory, that Hume
s primary reMection of divine action in history is
Eecause it would constitute a miracle, and a miracle would Ee a contradiction of
the causal laws of nature. Hume says such a violation of the law of causality can
not Ee allowed.
 Yet, and here is the curious turn in his thinking, his so-called
skepticism aEout the cosmological proof of God is Eased on his denial that we
can know whether there is any such thing as causality.

 The only things we
know, he says, are things which are immediately sensuous᪽i.e., what we can
physically see, touch, hear, smell, and taste. Incidentally, Hume
s skepticism
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aEout causality is the very thing that Kant said awakened me of out my dog
matic slumEer
 Eecause Hume
s theory destroyed the philosophical Easis of sci
ence itself.
At any rate, Hume wanted to have it Eoth ways. He uses the law of causahty
against theistic arguments, Eut then uses it in a self-serving way to support his
rehgious skepticism. Interestingly enough, Mackie emEraces Hume
s argument
to support his reasons for not Eelieving in the Christian revelation of God in his
tory, Eut nowhere does he note this logical inconsistency in Hume
s thinking.
In fact, Mackie falls victim to the same contradiction. He argues against the
cosmological argument LeiEini]
s version Eecause we allegedly cannot know
that everything must have a sufficient reason.
A Yet his argument against mira
cles is that it contradicts the natural law of reason which assumes that every
thing must have a rational, causal e[planation.
A He insists on the rational princi
ple of causality to disallow miracle and Mustify his atheism, Eut he disTualifies
the theist
s use of causal reasoning which would reTuire that God is the ultimate
Cause of everything. Mackie dogmatically asserts that causal reasoning Mustifies
atheism, and at the same time dogmatically disallows causal reasoning to Ee
used Ey theists for e[plaining the origin of the world. Like Hume, it is okay
when the principle of causality serves his purposes, Eut not okay when it
doesn
t. He says that we might well wish the universe conformed to our intellec
tual preference for some ultimate cause, Eut we have no right to assume that
the universe will comply with our intellectual preferences. In the same vein,
Mackie should also allow that he might wish that the universe was not open to a
divine miracle, Eut he has no right to assume that the universe will comply with
his intellectual preference.
In the final analysis, whether or not a miracle has occurred such as the incar
nation of an infinite God is a historical Tuestion, not merely a philosophical one.
)urther, if Mackie as he must do allows that causal reasoning is valid and nec
essary for understanding the seTuence of individual occurrences in nature and
in history, then it is even more compelling to see that the larger whole of reality
also Ee e[plained according to causal reasoning. To say the whole of reality is an
irrational given is to undermine reason itself. )or that would Ee to say that there
is no reason why reasoning e[ists, and if there is no reason why reasoning e[ists,
then reason cannot e[ist )or it is the very nature of reasoning to find an e[pla
nation why everything and anything e[ists. Even if there were an infinite regress
in the past so that the world was eternal, causal reasoning still reTuires us to ask
the larger Tuestion of the whole and why there is anything rather than sheer
nothing.
IS GOD-TALK MERELY EMOTIONAL"
The reasons for faith or unfaith are never simply Eased on the empirical evi
dence. The critical factor is personal Mudgment. Why do some people Eelieve and
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others do not" To Ee sure, a scholarly Mudgment to Eeheve or not to Eelieve is
Eased on a consideration of the whole Eody of evidence, Eut this Mudgment is
largely personal and intuitive. There are many factors which influence this intu
itive Mudgment. Certainly cultural and traditional elements are important.
Emotional factors as well are fairly decisive. The attitudes which we developed
throughout our life are most important. Damaged emotions and hurt feelings,
along with severely disappointing religious e[pectations, contriEute to our atti
tudes of skepticism and despair. On the other hand, many do not Eeheve
Eecause they fail to see the practical or personal relevance of faith. Others would
like to Eelieve, Eut think the empirical evidence is insufficient. Yet many Eeheve
Eecause they see its practical and personal relevance, and are convinced of its
rational empirical evidence. Even in Jesus
 day, some Eeheved in him as the Son
of God, Eut most did not.
To illustrate further the personal element of having to Mudge the evidence and
logic of faith, one can oEserve the difference in opinion Eetween Mackie and Kai
Nielsen, Eoth of whom are self-avowed atheists. Mackie thinks the logic of
Christian theological language is entirely intelligiEle and coherent, Eut Nielsen
frankly calls the God-language of Christian thought incoherent and confused. As
we have pointed out, Richard SwinEurne has devoted much of his scholarly
efforts to demonstrating the coherence of Christian talk aEout God. Mackie
agrees with SwinEurne, Eut Nielsen does not. Yet Eoth Mackie and Nielsen agree
against SwinEurne
s view of theism.
How does one know whether Mackie or Nielsen is correct" Or SwinEurne"
The answer is in part that there is a personal intuitive element in all knowing.
Not only are the empirical facts of our e[perience characteri]ed Ey epistemic
proEaEility, Eut even our understanding of what is logical is suEMect to dispute.
This is not a case for skepticism, Eut a frank acknowledgement of our finite, lim
ited understanding of the nature of truth.
Mackie is certainly correct in saying that a persuasive factor is our under
standing of the evidence as a whole.A᪽ What Mackie minimi]es is the larger role
which intuitive Mudgments play in the decision-making process. More specifical
ly, Mackie fails to show the larger role that our presuppositions e[ercise in the
attitudes we develop concerning the larger Eody of evidence.
Of course, Mackie is right to point out that the psychological dimension is not
an adeTuate foundation for a thoughtful person to Ease their faith on.A
 But,
Mackie fails to give the feeling dimension due consideration as part of the larger
Eody of evidence. Aristotle De Anima and Rhetoric, and the long history of phi
losophy, recogni]e the epistemic value of feeling and emotion.A
 Mackie appar
ently would simply reduce religion to mere feeling and then dismiss it.
)eeling is intrinsic to a rational understanding of the meaning of life. While
feeling is not always to Ee trusted in informing us aEout the oEMective truth of
our world, we certainly could not know in the fullest sense of the term without
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our capacity for feeling. Our capacity to know truly can go no deeper than our
capacity to feel, Eut our feehngs can certainly Ee deeper than our capacity to
know. The larger Eody of people in the history of the world have generally
relied more upon their feelings than upon their capacity to reason in deciding
the fundamental issues of life. That does not mean feelings are inherently anti
thetical to reason, Eut our capacity for feeling is more spontaneous and provides
us with a more immediate perception of things, whereas our capacity to reason
is more deliEerate and provides us with a mediated interpretation of reality.
The fact that rehgion is so deeply part and parcel of the human situation, as is
evidenced Ey what most people in the history of the world have felt, cannot Ee
easily discarded as irrational. To conclude that God does not e[ist Eecause feel
ing is an integral part of religious Eelief is unMustifiaEle. While the tendency of
modern theology has often Eeen to put faith on the side of feeling as
Schleiermacher did, Mackie puts atheism on the side of reason and reMects the
cognitive significance of feeling. Yet reason devoid of feeling is no longer true
reason. )or reason cannot dispense with the Easic feeling of trust, meaningful-
ness, purpose, and unity and still do the task of developing a well-reasoned per
spective on life.
Interestingly enough, the successor of A. J. Ayer as professor of logic at the
University of O[ford is Michael Dummett, a devout Roman Catholic Christian.
In contrast to Ayer who was the leading logical empiricist in Britain, his view is
that if he did not Eelieve in God, there would Ee little motivation for him to
study philosophy and logic. He Eecame a Christian Eecause he thought it was
the reasonaEle thing to do. He says, 
T think it
s only to do with the =eitgeist that
religious Eelief is intellectually e[tremely unfashionaEle.AA
In regard to the impasse of the role of logic in deciding the Tuestion of God
s
e[istence, Hein] W. Cassirer
s reason for Eecoming a Christian are revealing. His
father was the eminent Kantian scholar, Ernst Cassirer. Hein] Cassirer went to
Britain in 934 and taught at Glasgow University. At the age of thirty, even
Eefore going to Britain, he was recogni]ed as an authority on Aristotle. When he
Eecame a permanent faculty memEer at Glasgow University in 94, he Eecame
in his own right an authority on Kant
s philosophy. At the age of 50, he says he
had no knowledge whatever of religious proElems nor any interest in them. My
sole preoccupation was with philosophical Tuestions.A )or some ine[plicaEle
reason, when he was fifty years old Cassirer Eegan to read the Apostle Paul. He
was immediately impressed with Paul
s moral insights and understanding of the
relationship Eetween law and grace. Cassirer also admits that he had grown dis
satisfied with the pretensions of reason which he thinks typically characteri]e
the writings of philosophers.
While philosophy is supposed on all sides to Ee a purely rational activity,
relying upon the intellect and the intellect alone, without ever allowing
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itself to Ee swayed Ey any personal or emotional Eias, there remains this
disturEing fact: Utterly different conclusions are reached Ey various
thinkers, each philosopher arguing with great vehemence and ingenuity in
favor of the position he wishes to uphold, while yet the possiEility is whol
ly e[cluded that agreement might Ee reached Eetween him and his oppo
nents. This, of course, raises the crucial proElem whether any such thing as
a rehaEle criterion of truth is availaEle within the compass of philosophical
thinking at all. So far as I could see, no satisfactory solution had ever Eeen
offered.A

In the light of the impasse which reason was locked into, he wondered
whether the intellect was really a suitaEle instrument for dealing with the fun
damental proElems of e[istence.AA
At the age of 5, Cassirer was Eapti]ed and wrote a treatise on Paul, Kant and
the HeErew prophets, which he called Grace and Law. At the conclusion of his
Eook, he e[plains his reasons for coming to accept the Christian faith. It was
Eecause of the moral, life-changing message of the grace of God of which Paul
was a powerful witness. As for myself, I may e[plain here that, if I have come
to emErace the Christian religion, this has Eeen almost wholly due to the impres
sion made upon me not only Ey St. Paul
s teaching Eut Ey his personality as it
reveals itself in his epistles.AA He goes on to say there is only one way a human
Eeing can Eecome his or her true self, and that is Ey making a complete surren
der to Christ.3᪽
Is it really possiEle to conclusively prove that the Christian faith is true"
Cassirer writes:
I am, of course, fully aware that nothing that has Eeen said may serve to
estaElish either that Jesus Christ is the Son of God or that he appeared to St.
Paul on the road to Damascus. Yet, as I have remarked Eefore, I myself
have no douEt that St. Paul is right on Eoth counts. This is largely Eecause
the impression I have formed of St. Paul is that he was the very last man to
fall victim to self-deception and Eecause, in conseTuence, I find it impossi
Ele to entertain seriously the idea that his spiritual pilgrimage had a hallu
cinatory e[perience for its starting point.AA
I suspect that Hein] Cassirer
s testimony would smack of sheer suEMectivity
for Mackie. But at least Cassirer gave the EiElical documents a serious study and
the overall Eody of evidence persuaded him that faith in Christ is reasonaEly
Eased in oEMective truth. The point is, Mackie professes atheism and the Easis of
his decision involves more factors than he is willing to admit. Our choices aEout
the meaning of life, or its lack of meaning, are never purely rationalistic and
intellectualistic, as Cassirer accurately points out.
The foundational issues of life are not decided Ey reasoning deductively or
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non-deductively, as important as Eoth types of reasoning are. The decision of
truth is finally arrived at through dialectic dialogical thinking. Out of the con
versations of Eoth private and puElic life, of Eoth practical and academic life, do
the attitudes we develop aEout trust, unity, meaning and purpose take shape.
The decisive issue is not simply having a grasp of the larger Eody of evidence,
Eut the attitudes which we Ering to that larger Eody of evidence. Mackie fails to
consider this larger epistemic dimension of reason which includes values, feel
ings, emotions and attitudes.
Mackie presumes too much when he thinks he proves that God does not e[ist.
Hence he calls it a miracle that any should Eelieve. T. H. Hu[ley, the father of
modern agnosticism, very much disliked theologians who thought they could
prove God
s e[istence, Eut even more distasteful to Hu[ley were the philoso
phers who were atheists: Of all the senseless EaEEle I have ever had occasion to
read, the demonstrations of these philosophers who undertake to tell us all
aEout the nature of God would Ee the worst, if they were not surpassed Ey the
still greater aEsurdities of the philosophers who try to prove that there is no
God.
Though Hume did not try to prove atheism, he did reduce knowledge to feel
ing or sentiment. The guide to life, he says, is custom estaElished Ey our natural
instincts and feelings, not reason.
 Rational reflection would immoEili]e us com
pletely in the clutches of skepticism were not nature too strong for us, Hume
oEserves.
 Hume inconsistently uses reason to show that reason is not our guide
in life
Bertrand Russell, a religious agnostic, says that Hume
s skepticism was
insincere, Eecause having undermined reason he then appealed to reason for
developing his own interpretation of the world.A Hume was prepared to say that
we do not really know anything᪽not even the real physical world Eeyond our
senses. It is difficult to argue with a skeptic Eecause they make no real claims to
knowledge. The only way that Mackie can Ee consistent on this point is to Ee a
skeptic, Eut instead he is an avowed atheist.
Mackie does not follow Hume
s reasoning to this final conclusion. Nowhere
does Mackie propose that our guide to life is a custom which is grounded in pas
sion and feeling as opposed to reason. Nor does he suggest that he emEraces a
skeptical attitude aEout our claims to knowledge. )or Hume, reason e[poses the
uncertainties and amEiguities of our understanding of life which would propel
us into the aEyss of Pyrrhonianism if our natural instincts and feehngs did not
override our rational reflection. But Mackie assumes that reason is our guide to
life which frees us from skepticism and enaEles us to reMect a religious perspec
tive on life altogether.
I suspect that Hume, despite Mackie
s attempt to Ee a modern restatement of
Hume
s epistemic sensationahsm, would not take too kindly to this misappro
priation of his thought. I say this Eecause on one occasion when Hume was din-
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ing with the philosophes of Paris, he caustically remarked that he didr?
t Eelieve in
the e[istence of atheists. Baron d
HolEach replied to Hume that he had Eeen
most unfortunate and that now he was surrounded Ey seventeen atheists.
 The
point of Hume
s comment was that any alleged atheist is claiming to know more
than what is possiEle for the human mind to reasonaEly conclude. Both the athe
ism of his Paris friends and their commitment to a mechanistic e[planation of
the universe were more than Hume Eelieved could Ee rationally proved.
Apparently Mackie thinks he has developed the logic of Hume
s philosophi
cal sensationalism more consistently than his mentor, Eut it is far from clear that
the whole Eody of evidence which Mackie emEraces for himself proves his athe
istic conclusion. Russell may Ee right when he accuses Hume of Eeing insin
cere in his attack on reason
s aEility to demonstrate the truth of anything, Eut
Mackie is virtually uncritical and deadly serious aEout reason
s aEility to prove
his atheistic perspective. There is hardly a tinge of even a mild form of skepti
cism in Mackie
s philosophical point of view It is apparent that theists aren
t the
only ones who sometimes surrender to dogmatism
Mackie also Eriefly alludes to three other sources for e[plaining the nature of
religion᪽)euerEach, Mar[ and )reud. These three sources are perhaps more
widely used as a Easis for emEracing the atheistic position than Hume, perhaps
Eecause they are more clearly atheistic in their thinking than was Hume, as well
as the fact that their writings are more widely known. )euerEach
s idea of God
as a proMection of human ideals was a significant landmark in the history of athe
ism Eecause he was the first to offer a genuinely philosophical Mustification for
modern atheism. To Ee sure, modern atheism originated in the development of
modern natural science and its mechanistic interpretation of the world provided
Ey the eighteenth century )rench materialists.A Mar[
s socio-economic interpre
tation of religion has also Eeen widely influential. But )reud
s psychological
analysis of religion as compensation for repressed comple[es and unconscious
wishes has given atheism a Eroad Easis of acceptance, even though )euerEach
s
analysis is generally recogni]ed to Ee more philosophically persuasive.A Each of
these interpretations has Eeen Eriefly incorporated into Mackie
s thought with
little critical e[amination, and he limits the possiEle sources of religion to these
social, economic and psychological factors as they have Eeen oEserved in the so-
called natural history of religion, as Hume termed it in his writings, as opposed
to a supernatural history of revelation.
IS GOD-TALK NEUROTIC"
Mackie thinks it strange that so many rehgious people draw from psychology
and its insights into human emotion as support for theism.A It surely seems fair
to say that Mackie is uncomfortaEle with the role which emotion and feeling
play in our perception of truth. This is illustrated in his assessment of
Niet]sche
s style of atheism. He thinks that Niet]sche
s terminology, God is
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dead
 is a silly concept.
 Mackie apparently fails to reali]e the depth of
human feeling concerning the reality of God. Niet]sche
s dramatic Tuestion, Is
God dead" Where has God gone" reflects the emotional loss which modern
atheism emEraces. Mackie
s rather emotionally casual and nonchalant e[amina
tion of God
s e[istence portrays that, for him, not much of a positive value is
really at stake if God doesn
t e[ist.
Though he is Tuite sure that psychological factors are the ultimate source of
religions, the taEles can Ee turned and it could Ee argued that atheistic theories
are faith-systems as well and are also merely a psychological compensation for
reducing neurotic stress. At least Karl Jung so interpreted )reud
s atheism and





s need to refute theism and defend atheism could Ee
open to such a psychological analysis, even as he has accused religious people of
the need to mask their own fears. Harvard psychologist, Gordon Allport, cau
tioned that those who find the religious principle of life illusory would do well
not to scrutini]e their own working principles too closely. It certainly seems
e[tremely strange, that if religion is merely Eased on fantasy and is so irrational,
that it would generate such a lifelong oEsession and reTuire such a serious,
scholarly refutation as Mackie provides. Gordon Allport has shown that religion
can Ee an important aspect of developing a mature personality. He writes: A
man
s religion is the audacious Eid he makes to Eind himself to creation and to
the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own person
ality Ey finding the supreme conte[t in which he rightly Eelongs.
A In this
respect, it can Ee argued that Mackie
s atheism is his own personal religious
attempt to provide a sense of meaning and purpose to his own life. It is
inevitaEle that one will attempt to locate hisher own individuality within the
larger conte[t of reality. Whether or not one can e[perience a sense of peace and
security with the denial of any larger meaningful conte[t is e[actly the Tuestion
which everyEody must decide for oneself. Mackie may Ee perfectly content with
out a larger meaningful conte[t, Eut this lack of unity and meaning is the essence
of nihilism. Mackie simply asserts that goodness and value are inherently
human.
 He has no further need to ask why this is so. He also refuses to feel the
nihilistic implications of his atheism.
What is also a glaring omission in Mackie
s use of Hume
s philosophy, as
noted aEove, is that he completely ignores Hume
s claim to Ee a skeptic. There is
not a large difference Eetween Hume
s skepticism and Niet]sche
s nihilism᪽
e[cept that the latter e[presses a depth of feeling aEout the loss of certainty and
meaning of the world which is suppressed in skepticism. Hume writes of his own
philosophy: By all that has Eeen said the reader will easily perceive that the phi
losophy contained in this Eook is very skeptical and tends to give us a notion of
the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reason
ing is there reduced to e[perience, and the Eelief which attends e[perience is
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s appropriation of Hume
s philosophy stops short of emErac
ing his skepticism, Eut he has simply e[changed it for a narrow dogmatism.
Mackie denies he is a nihilist, Eut without a larger conte[t of meaning to
which he can relate his life, it would certainly seem that he is a nihilist whether
he recogni]es it or not. Toward the end of his life, Niet]sche wrote: That I have
Eeen Easically a nihilist is something that I have only recently come to admit.
A
Niet]sche
s slow admission of his nihilism leads him to say that it seems impos
siEle that 
aimlessness in itself should Ee the Easis of our faith. 
A Niet]sche
seems to admit here that a pure nihilism is really impossiEle from the standpoint
of consistency. Being the logician that Mackie is, he certainly could not emErace
nihilism without feeling the contradiction. Yet, if atheism is the final word᪽that
God is aEsent and that no larger reason for the meaning of the universe can Ee
had᪽there can Ee no effective philosophical defense against nihilism Hans
Kung, while recogni]ing that all atheists are not necessarily nihilists, made this
point in his Eook. Does God E[ist"AA and Mackie was particularly annoyed Ey it.

Niet]sche
s atheism at least catches the depth of human feeling and thinking
in contrast to Mackie
s too comfortaEle refutation of Eelief in God. This is not to
say that Mackie should not Ee taken seriously. Indeed, his considerations are
worthy and respectaEle. But his conclusions are too hasty and too sweeping to
Ee considered a final Elow to religious e[perience.
Among other reasons why Mackie
s atheism is not convincing is that he
shows little awareness of the e[istential feeling which Tillich calls the aEysmal
depth of reality. The feeling that we are strung out over the aEyss is not neces
sarily a pathological, psychological state of mind. It defines our ontological situ
ation. Neurotic fears are irrational diversions which distract our attention from
the real source of our an[ieties. Ideologies and doctrines, even if they are atheis
tic ideologies and doctrines, can Ee rationali]ations to hide our neurotic insecuri
ties. These an[ieties may Ee relieved through therapy, Eut the e[istential an[iety
of meaningless and nothingness cannot Ee cured᪽though it may Ee covered up
and denied in neurotic rationali]ations.
In further developing the nihilism of Niet]sche, the continental e[istentialists
are certainly insightful in pinpointing the conseTuence of a world without God.
Can atheism Ee taken seriously without the depth of feeling which nihilism
entails" Any atheism which denies the implications of nihilism as its conse
Tuence is emotionally shallow. )or it fails to come to terms with the an[iety of
meaninglessness. If the history of religions proves anything, it proves that the
feeling of aloneness and emptiness is a universal feeling which pushes one to try
to come to terms with the ultimate meaning and purpose of the universe. This
emotional need for a satisfying relationship with the larger meaning of the uni
verse is essentially a rehgious need. To acknowledge this psychological need is
not to e[plain away rehgious e[perience. It is to recogni]e, as did Augustine,
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that we were intended to have a relationship with God and that we cannot find
peace and rest in the world until we find peace and rest in God.
There can Ee no emotionally fulfilling relationships and human happiness in
the truest sense of the term in our world apart from this religious dimension. It
is this religious perception which universally stamps the pages of human histo
ry. It does not seem reasonaEle to conclude that this universal cry of the human
heart for the warmth of divine love and protection can Ee e[plained away as
merely infantile and mere wishful thinking. Such a conclusion resemEles more of
a denial of our e[istential needs than a genuine openness to our need for reality
and truth. To Ee sure, this e[istential need in itself does not prove the e[istence
of a personal God. Nor can it Ee used to Mustify any particular religious Eelief.
But it is a rationally significant factor for recogni]ing the validity of the religious
dimension in reality.
C. S. Lewis writes: Creatures are not Eorn with desires unless satisfaction for
those desires e[ists. If we are cold, there is warmth which we seek. If we are
thirsty, there is water to satisfy our thirst. If we are tired, there is rest for our
Eodies. If we desire fellowship and unity Eeyond what this world can offer, the
most proEaEle e[planation is that I was made for another world. If none of my
earthly pleasures satisfy iL that does not prove that the universe is a fraud.
ProEaEly earthly pleasures were never meant to satisfy iL Eut only to arouse iL
to suggest the real thing.
Mackie gives consideraEle attention to William James
s 9arieties of Religious
E[perience. James Eelieves his studies of first-hand reports, Eoth puEhshed and
unpuElished, show that the origin of rehgious e[perience is more than self-sug
gestion. Mackie reMects this conclusion. Instead he offers a psychological e[plana
tion which draws upon Hume
s idea that fear is the origin of rehgion.

It may well Ee that fear is a motivation for people Eecoming religious. But
what is fear" Since the rise of psychoanalysis, we have Eeen made aware of the
more precise distinction Eetween fear and an[iety dread. )ear is an emotional
response to a specific danger, whereas an[iety dread is an emotional response
to a more diffused and uncertain danger. The classic treatise on an[iety is found
in Kierkegaard
s writings, Eut Tilhch
s The Courage to Be provides a helpful and
insightful discussion in which he distinguished Eetween e[istential an[iety and
neurotic an[iety. E[istential an[iety is the universal condition of our finite e[is
tence as we feel threatened Ey guilt, meaninglessness and finally death.
Unfortunately, Mackie does not pursue this distinction Eetween fear and the var
ious kinds of an[ieties.
PresumaEly Hume thought fear was a universal emotion in reaction to our
need for safety and security. He apparently had in mind a pathological defini
tion of fear which is inhiEiting and destructive of human personality. Hume
s
life was apparently free of these neurotic tendencies according to his own
account. He descriEed himself as a man of mild disposition and an open.
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social, cheerful humor. Did Hume feel a sense of e[istential an[iety as he con
sidered the larger meaning of life in general" Apparently not. Shortly Eefore his
death, he composed a funeral oration of himself.
 The ruling passion of his
life was literary fame, though he says his disappointment of not achieving it
never soured my temper.
It is apparent that Mackie likewise did not feel the e[istential an[ieties associ
ated with our finitude. Certainly that he reMected nihilism would seem to indicate
that he felt free of these an[ious feelings. In fact, many intellectual people dis
claim any awareness of e[istential an[iety and feelings of estrangement. Many
well-educated people simply enMoy a comfortaEle kind of pragmatism without
the slightest hint of Eeing plagued with the kind of e[istential an[iety and
despair which Kierkegaard, Niet]sche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus and
Tillich wrote aEout.
Even though many American and British people do not feel the e[istential
despair as opposed to a neurotic despair which arises out of our finiteness, this
does not in itself mean that it isn
t there. In fact, it could Ee thought that the
denial of any feeling of e[istential an[iety may Ee symptomatic of an undiag
nosed neurotic fear. But, of course, even when people admit their e[istential an[
iety, they will not necessarily Eecome theists. 4uite the contrary, the continental
European e[istentialists developed atheism directly in response to their aware
ness of e[istential an[iety. In their case, atheism was consciously developed in
response to the emotion of fear dread.A
Are we to conclude, then, that e[istentialist atheism is discredited Eecause it
was intentionally developed out of an attempt to come to terms with the emo
tion of fear" If we follow the thinking of Mackie᪽who concluded that theism is
invalidated Eecause it arose as an attempt to resolve the emotion of fear᪽then
we ought to conclude that atheism can also Ee so discredited
Mackie refines Hume
s theory Ey incorporating )reud
s interpretation of reh
gion. Mackie writes: Religion e[presses and seems to fulfill very strong and
persistent wishes, Eoth conscious and unconscious, and that the Eeliever
s sup
posed relation to God or the gods is significantly like that of a child to its par
ents, and is proEaEly influenced Ey the adult
s memory of that relation, will
hardly Ee disputed.A Mackie
s uncritical acceptance of )reud
s view of religion
as a universal oEsessional neurosis is surprising, to say the least. )or, despite the
enormous influence of )reud in the modern world and the significant amount of
pioneering work which he did in psychology, his views, and especially his reli
gious views, have not Eeen followed uncritically even Ey his own students.
Karl Jung was )reud
s most distinguished student, and )reud had wanted
him to Ee his successor.
 They enMoyed a close friendship for a time until )reud
aEruptly Eroke with Jung over the issue of religion. Jung frankly says that
)reud himself had a neurosis, no douEt diagnoseaEle and one with highly trou
Elesome symptoms.A
 He in particular Eeheved that at the core of )reud
s neuro-
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sis was his denial of the religious aspects of his own personal e[istence.A As evi
dence of his neurosis, one Eiographer of Karl Jung reports that )reud wanted a
son himself Jung. This was seen in the way that )reud had a strong need for
Jung to accept his views. )reud fainted twice when Jung e[pressed disagreement
with )reud over the death wish.A This Eiographer also oEserves that the rela




Among the hundreds of patients that sought out Jung, he oEserved that a key
factor in their an[iety disorders was a loss of faith and religious e[perience. He
also oEserved that their recovery was directly related to their aEility to once
again e[perience the meaning of their lost religious faith.A

Paul 9it], a psychologist from New York University, recently has argued that
atheism is an unconscious Oedipal wish-fulfillment.... that comes from the very
center of )reudian theory.A Unlike )reud
s interpretation of the Oedipus
Comple[, 9it] suggested that atheism can Ee the result of those who reMect God
as their )ather Eecause of their desire to kill their own fathers. In fact, 9it] shows
that )reud
s dislike of his own earthly father was highly influential in the devel
opment of )reud
s atheism. Not religion, Eut atheism is an oEsessional neuro
sisA )reud
s attack on religion was thus a proMection of his own neurosis.
One widely known and respected Neo-)reudian was Karen Horney. While
retaining what she considered the fundamentals of )reud
s teachings, she dis
agreed with )reud
s view that neurosis can Ee e[plained as a compulsive,
instinctive drive aimed at satisfaction. Rather, disturEed human relationships are
the cause of an[iety disorders.AA Horney descriEes one of the symptoms of dis
turEed human relationships as the need to move away from people. This is the
need to Ee e[cessively self-sufficient, detached, and totally adeTuate in oneself.
One of its primary symptoms is the inaEility to involve oneself in commitment
and trust.A

A British psychoanalyst, )rank Lake, has also written e[tensively on this an[i
ety disorder. He calls it the schi]oid position.A The schi]oid position is distrust
ful of feeling and emotion in general. It suppresses all feelings᪽hate, love, Moy,
sadness.A
 Scorn also characteri]es schi]oid Eehavior.A
 Lake notes that )reud was
unaEle to recogni]e e[istential an[iety Eecause he did not regard dependence
on personal sources outside the self as the prereTuisite of a truly human Eeing.
Lake Eelieves )reud
s own neurosis was of the schi]oid type.A
The opposite of the need to move away from others reflected in the schi]oid
position in what Horney calls the need of moving toward people. This is typ
ical of the hysterical compliant person who clings to others Eecause of a com
pulsory need to Ee hked and receive affection in an indiscriminate fashion.

These two attitudes reflect the Easic positions of those who suffer from neurotic
an[iety. The schi]oidself-sufficientprivate person distrusts feeling Eecause
feelings put one in a dependent relationship upon others. In contrast to
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Oriental philosophy, which pri]es detachment as a means of spiritual achieve
ment, neurotic detachment is not a choice, Eut is an inner compulsion.
 Horney
further points out that the most striking need for the neurotic detached person is
for self-sufficiency and its most positive e[pression is resourcefulness.
Blaise Pascal recogni]ed this resourcefulness of some philosophers who seek
to defend themselves against the commitment of faith. Their intellectuahst
defenses protect their minds from the inner truth aEout themselves. The philoso
phers, he says, have turned away from the lust of sensory pleasure and the lust
of power for the lust of knowledge they are unaEle to have faith in what hes
Eeyond them and so they suEstitute faith in their own reason. Pascal says the
philosopher encourages us to find rest in ourselves. But Pascal says this cannot
produce inner rest. It only comes from a commitment to God who is the source
of reason and truth.A In light of Pascal
s emphasis on the warmth of divine fel
lowship, it is not surprising that Mackie is so predisposed against him.A᪽
Kierkegaard also knew the inadeTuacy of finite reason and our inaEility to
e[perience true meaning from within ourselves apart from commitment to a per
sonal God. His own writings grew out of the laEoratory of his life. He knew
from e[perience the commitment an[iety of the schi]oid position. As Lake
oEserves, apart from Kierkegaard
s commitment to the God revealed in Jesus
Christ who sustained him, he could not have Eeen so open and so forthright in
the insights of mental suffering. Lake writes: A primary characteristic of afflic
tion and despair is its attempt to remain hidden. Precisely those who suffer most
from it most wish to hide it.. ..even from oneself.A

Why are people afflicted with the schi]oid position" According to psychoana
lytic theory, it is the result of a catastrophic splitting of the person in the earliest
weeks and months of one
s life. It is usually associated with the loss of a signifi
cant person
s face as mother. It Eegins where the union with mother is lost. The
schi]oid is one who can
t trust in the out there Eecause they have no early
memory of a secure world centered in a source person who came to answer
them in their time of need. They also tend to Ee contemptuous of those who do
Eelieve in the out there.A

Psychoanalytic studies show that this neurotic dread is driven underground
Eecause it is intoleraEle to the conscious mind. Dread is the insecure feeling of
living in an isolated world where you are the only oEMect. In the hysterical-emo
tional person, this fear causes the person to cling to others in the retreating-
intellectual person, this fear causes people to detach themselves from dependen
cy on others and they develop a sense of self-sufficiency and are Tuite resource
ful in constructing a meaningful world all of their own.
)or many years medical science assumed that the nervous system of a EaEy
was too undeveloped for memories of Eirth and of the earliest months of life to
Ee recorded in the Erain. But since the 950s, the psychiatric use of aEreactive
drug therapy has shown Must how vividly the earliest events of life are imprinted
The Miracle ofAtheism  
on the mind. Patients hterally were aEle to relive the trauma of Eirth and the
damaging e[perience of suffocation as they were pushed through the Eirth
canal. Other patients have Eeen aEle to relive, through aEreactive drug therapy,
the earliest hours immediately following their Eirth, and memories of aEandon
ment, isolation, and human coldness often have Eeen the e[perience of those
infants who later Eecame afflicted with commitment-an[iety.

Lake, who has done e[tensive clinical work with schi]oid persons, Eelieves
that the Eitter memories of unloving faces and stern voices at the time of Eirth
are the Eeginnings of man
s distortion of the truth aEout the ultimate personal
reality, God Himself. With rare insight. Lake shows that this is where the lie is
first told aEout God, the lie which Eedevils humanity, which determines our soli
darity with the race in ignorance, pride, fear, an[iety, despair, idolatry and lust,
unEelief and murderous hatred of God Himself.

If relationships at home have Eeen developed in an appropriate fashion, the
foundation for the development of one
s own ideas and Eeliefs has Eeen laid. But
when this foundation has Eeen cracked Ey poor relationships, the child learns to
relate to the outside world either Ey clinging to others or Ey detaching oneself
from others. UndouEtedly many people have a clinging and panic-driven rela
tionship to God. They often speak of their relationship to God in highly emotion
al and affective terms. They may even give the appearance of Eeing super-spiri
tual, which is usually compensation for feelings of insecurity.
Detaching oneself from others is a commitment-an[iety disorder which also
may have religious implications it is the attempt to protect ourselves from Eeing
hurt Ey creating distance from others. The affliction of dread is seen particularly
in intellectual people who are especially resourceful in creating a world of con-
ceptuality which promises protection from e[perience and reTuires no oEliga
tions to others.

 The special difficulty of someone suffering from an[iety-com
mitment is the failure to feel the presence and love of God as a caring heavenly
)ather. This person finds it difficult to feel Eecause he or she is locked into a
world of protective reason.
This is the neurotic position most typical of intellectual people, as Lake has
shown. The hysterical?clinging person desires a person-centered universe which
will guarantee security and safety. But the schi]oid position has no need for such
a personal universe. As Lake puts iL The craving is for an order Eased on any
thing Eut dependence on others. Since all that has Eeen offered Ey availaEle per
sons amounts, not to an ordered world, Eut to chaos, the ego takes refuge in a
order Eased on its own cogitations.
 Lake identifies the e[istentialist theolo
gians, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, as representative of the schi]oid posi
tion Eecause of their attitude of distrust toward the historical foundation of
Christian faith and their impersonal view of God.


 Lake shows that St. Paul
s
warnings against inflated intellectuahsm and gnostic speculation, in the first let
ter to the Corinthians and the Colossian letters, are directed at the kinds of
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defenses typical of the schi]oid position. Lake writes:
The gnostic
s view of ordinary Christians and indeed of the BiElical record
itself is that of the superior person. He assumes he knows Eetter than the
record of the witnesses Eecause he always feels his own independent men
tal aristocracy as an endowment which must take precedence over mere
evidence in the oEMective world. Gnostics show disdain, and not a little Eit
terness, towards them. This reveals something of the secret scorn of them
selves in which they were driven. It conceals and denies their deep envy of
warm human ties, against the acceptance of which their life is in recoil.

One e[ample of scorn and distrust is reflected in a deEate on theismatheism
which took place on the campus of the University of Mississippi in 9 in
which two of the several participants were J. P. Moreland and Antony )lew.
)lew is an analytical philosopher whose sympathies are with the logical empiri
cist and their verification theory of truth. J. P. Moreland is a Christian theist who
Eases his faith on the historical revelation of God in Jesus of Na]areth as record
ed in the New Testament. Moreland, having already argued a careful and rea
soned defense of theism, gave personal testimony to his faith in Christ in a warm
and loving manner. )lew
s response was: Moreland
s appeal to his 
personal
e[periences
 strikes me as aEsolutely grotesTue. This inaEility to respect the
witness of someone else, along with the scornful e[pression of a superior atti
tude, Eear all the marks of the schi]oid position which psychoanalysts descriEe.
It is one thing not to Ee persuaded Ey someone
s testimony, Eut it is Tuite anoth
er matter to Erush aside someone
s personal e[perience with an air of arrogance
and condescension. The suppression of warm feelings is typical of the schi]oid
position.
HerEert Butterfield, the internationally respected CamEridge historian,
descriEes the e[cessive skepticism of some scholars toward EiElical history as
reflecting a kind of intellectual arrogance which in any field of research
reduces clarity of the mind.
᪽᪽ One cannot generali]e and say that anyone who
reMects the witness of the apostles concerning their faith in Jesus Christ is
schi]oid, Eut the e[cessive and Eiased attitude of some scholars toward EiElical
history may Ee accounted for in such a manner.
This oEservation may not Ee taken well Ey some, Eut it is usually skeptics like
Hume and atheists like Mackie who first Ering up this neurotic e[planation.
Mackie thus concludes that the central doctrines of theism cannot Ee rationally
defended.

 He agrees with Hume that our most holy religion.... is founded on
irrational fear faith, not on reason. And he insists, along with Hume and
)reud, that this irrational faith is the product of fear and an irrational wish-ful
fillment.
Now I am not saying that all atheists are neurotics. My point is that if one is
going to use the Humean and )reudian argument that faith is the product of
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neurosis, then the argument also can Ee made against atheism. I agree with Kai
Nielsen, who says he knows Eoth atheists and Christians who are neurotics, and
he knows Eoth atheists and Christians who are perfectly normal and sane. In
the final analysis, the truth of theism or atheism must Ee decided on grounds
other than psychoanalytic interpretations.
IS GOD-TALK ETHICAL"
Mackie
s surprisingly negative attitude toward lesus of Na]areth is remark
aEly uninformed and Eiased. He particularly takes e[ception to the widely sup
posed notion that Christian morality is particularly admiraEle.
 He inter
prets the Old Testament morality without Tualifications as EarEaric and savage.
He accuses Jesus of engaging in harsh and unloving Eehavior in contradiction to
his own preaching on love. He portrays lesus
 own ethic as Eeing irrational
and opposed to knowledge.
He reMects Jesus
 ethic to love our neighEor as ourselves Eecause this is only a
fantasy.A The neurotic connotation of this term, widely used in psychoanalyt
ic writings, can hardly Ee overlooked. Of course there are neurotic religious fan
tasies associated with perfectionistic symptoms among some Christian people.
But what Mackie fails to understand is the transforming grace of God which
Jesus reveals. Of course we can
t love the way Jesus taught us to do so without
his help. It
s impossiEle. But through a relationship with Jesus, whose will is one
with God, we can come to love like Jesus loved and taught us to love. And this is
no fantasy, Eut the healthy-minded lifestyle of a mature person reflected in 
Corinthians 3, as the psychoanalysL Karen Horney, also oEserved.

Patrick Sherry wrote a philosophical treatise on Eelief in God. His Eook was
called. Spirit, Saints, and Immortality. His main point is that the decisive oEMective
proof for God
s e[istence revealed through Jesus of Na]areth is the lives of the
saints, that is, anyone who is a genuine follower of Jesus Christ and has Eeen
transformed Ey his Spirit. What he argues is that if there is a God like Jesus pro
claimed, the rationally convincing element is the witness of persons transformed
Ey faith in Christ.

 Unfortunately, Mackie
s focus is almost e[clusively upon the
evidence of miracles as a Easis for confirming or disconfirming faith in God
rather than on the personal character and moral integrity of the lives of Christian
people.
It is certainly true that many Eehevers have not e[emplified the moral ideal of
love, as Mackie so rightly accuses. But for those Eelievers who consistently
practice the presence of God through daily devotional haEits and corporate acts
of puEhc worship, the grace-filled life of Jesus Christ will daily transform them
into his own moral image.
Mackie is right to this e[tent᪽if there is no transforming power in the teach
ing and life of Jesus with whom Eelievers claim to have a personal relationship,
then the God of Jesus does not e[ist. That
s the Eottom line. Unfortunately
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s Erief survey of some who claim to know God through miracles and
visions is focusing on the wrong kind of evidence. Even Jesus discredited those
who would Eelieve simply Eecause of alleged miracles and signs Matt. 2:39.
The final proof of genuine faith is the fruit of the Spirit᪽love, Moy, peace,
patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control Gal. 5:22-
23. Jesus said others will know who are his disciples Ey their fruit John 3:35.
Nowhere in the BiEle are we led to think that faith trust in God arises from
an aEstract, scholarly, academic, and ironclad proof of a miracle. Nowhere in the
New Testament documents is their any sensational display of miracles like a
magician would perform on stage. BiElical miracles are intended to Ering
redemption to the world, not to entertain. C. S. Lewis rightly limits the function
of physical miracles to e[tremely restricted situations which serve the larger
cause of the missionary situation of the Church.
 Not physical miracles, Eut the
holiness of Eelievers is the final proof of God
s e[istence. And holiness means
essentially loving God with all your heart and your neighEor as yourself.
Without this transforming power of the grace of God mediated through Jesus,
claims to know God would Ee meaningless and groundless. Holiness is primary
miracles are secondary
If Karen Horney has shown from the standpoint of psychoanalytic studies
that neurotic fear is rooted in the failure of human relationships,
 the BiEle
shows that the first negative human emotion to surface after our first parents
Eroke fellowship with God was fear᪽they were afraid and hid themselves Gen.
3:0. The purpose of the grace of God throughout the history of salvation which
culminated in Jesus Christ was to produce within human Eeings the love of God
which would Ering harmony and understanding among all people. This is why
the apostle John says that perfect love casts out fear. He says specifically that
there is no fear in love Eecause the love of Christ indwells us and we can love
each other as God loves us  John 4:7-.
If there is any ethic as admiraEle, as ennoEling, as e[cellent, if there is any
piece of literature that is comparaEle in its lofty, person-affirming ethic, if there
is any availaEle resource to change the character and life of any person into a
new, truly fulfilled individual, if there is any Eond of love which will unite a
fragmented world into a Must and holy people Eesides the gospel of grace offered
in Jesus Christ, it has not Eeen oEserved anywhere else in the history of the
world. This is why Rudolf Bultmann, who is certainly no friend to traditional
theism or orthodo[ Christianity, says frankly that there can Ee no true human
fulfillment and personal authenticity apart from faith in Christ. Why" He says
the Tuestion is not if this kind of authentic e[istence can Ee discovered some
where else in point of facL he says, this type of Tualitative e[istence has never
Eeen discovered apart from faith in Christ. He particularly notes that
Heidegger
s philosophy of e[istence is entirely dependent on the Christian faith
of Kierkegaard and Paul. Even the neo-Mar[ist philosopher, Ernst Bloch,
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admits that atheists are aEle to survive with a degree of meaning in life Eecause
they live off the Eorrowed credit credit of religious faith. The contriEution of
the Christian view of personhood to the modern world is widely acknowledged
also among secular psychologist and moral development theorists.
 I Eeheve it
could Ee argued that atheism without the Eenefit of Christian faith would
relapse us into the paganism of nature religions. In this respect, modern atheism
is really a Christian heresy and cannot survive on its own.
IS GOD-TALK IMMORAL"
Mackie reasons that it is logically incoherent to affirm that God is all-powerful
and all good since evil e[ists. Such a God who permitted evil would presum
aEly Ee immoral himself. Here again the attitudinal; feeling dimension comes
into play. The Eeliever, while recogni]ing the dilemma, trusts that there is a rea
son why God allows evil. )aith acknowledges that we do not have a completely
satisfactory reason yet, Eut in the future of God
s kingdom Eeyond the oEscurity
of this life we will know. )or now, logic can only take us so far in pointing out
the compatiEility of divine sovereignty and evil in the world. The Eest of the
arguments to e[plain the connection Eetween God and evil is the free-will
defense. It maintains that God chose to limit his sovereignty when he created
human Eeings in his image. The possiEility of evil is corollary to the fact of finite
freedom. This helps us to understand something of the logical proElem. )or
there is no possiEility of finite freedom and the development of personal respon
siEility without the possiEility of evil.
Yet what is disturEing from the Christian point of view is the e[istential feel
ing that there is too much evil rampant in the world for a good, almighty God to
permit. This is not a logical argument as such. It is strictly an intuitive perception
that pointless and irredeemaEle evil Elocks one
s aEility to Eelieve in God. Who
hasn
t felt this sense of distaste aEout God permitting the e[cessive, gratuitous
evil which allows the suffering and killing of innocent infants and children.
Today I listened to the confession of a 5-year-old girl who had Eeen raped
repeatedly Ey her father Eefore she ran away from home. Outrage Anger Why
God" If God is so good and so powerful, what is the point of permitting inno
cent children to Ee aEused se[ually"
Several years ago I was a chaplain
s assistant in a medical center. I was on call
with my Eeeper when I was summoned to the emergency room. When I arrived,
several doctors and a numEer of nurses were surrounding the Eody of an auto
moEile accident victim. One of the doctors shced him open, reached inside to
physically massage his heart in a lasL frantic attempt to save his life᪽all to no
avail. I had the responsiEihty of informing the family in the waiting room of his
death. He was 29 years of age and had two small children. I soon learned that his
wife had Eeen killed in an automoEile wreck the previous year. What could I tell
the grieving sisters, Erother, father, mother and two small children" What sense
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would it make to tell them that God loved and cared for them" None Would a
free-will theodicy comfort them" Hardly IncomprehensiEle suffering calls into
Tuestion the concept of a caring God.
Someone once told me aEout an answered prayer that God had provided the
financial means for them to afford medical insurance. Why would God provide
for the medical insurance of one person and yet not intervene to save the life of a
father inMured in a car wreck" Also ironically, this same person who oEtained
medical insurance later developed terminal cancer. Supposedly God provided
medical insurance so he could die from cancer without incurring astronomical
costs to him and his family. This terminally ill patient apparently never felt the
contradiction of his situation. I did. Perhaps I felt the irony of the situation
Eecause I wasn
t the one involved in the suffering. Perhaps the intense suffering
of the human soul creates a kind of spiritual perception which is not normally
apparent. I could have scoffed inwardly at the naivete of this patient, Eut then
perhaps the Moke was on me and my spiritual Elindness. Who was I to pass Mudg
ment on the providence or lack of it of God"
Wolfhart PannenEerg was asked in a forum at AsEury Theological Seminary
aEout his resolution of the proElem of suffering and the Christian concept of a
caring God, especially in the light of the holocaust.
PannenEerg replied Ey Tuoting from a Jewish author who said that after
Auschwit] no one can talk aEout God any longer. PannenEerg then remarked: 
always felt that you can say that only if you are in a position of watching a
tragedy in theater. You cannot say that, if you think of yourself in the place of
those who had to go into the gas ovens, Eecause those who had to walk that way
had their only hope in singing psalms. ...The power to deal with e[periences like
that is not in simply oEserving them in others, Eut if one has to go through them
oneself....The moment you Eelieve in God you get hold of the only power that
enaEles you face e[periences of terror like that.

The proElem of suffering, Moltmann says, is theodicy
s open Tuestion.
There is no final solution to the proElem᪽either for the theist or atheist. There is
no final answer to it, yet one cannot get rid of this nagging Tuestion᪽why evil"
)or the Eeliever it is an eschatological Tuestion. PannenEerg points out that this
proElem will persist until the last day. He maintains this issue will Ee defini
tively solved, not Ey our theoretical arguments, Eut only Ey the action of God
Himself in the future of His Kingdom.

The Tuestion, as E. L. Mascall has pointed out, is not whether God created the
Eest of all possiEle worlds. LeiEni] made a strong logical case for this position in
the eighteenth century in his Theodicy. The issue simply is that this is the world
God freely chose to create. God is infinite and his ways and reasons for doing
things are not entirely comprehensiEle to us. God is ultimately a mystery
Eecause he is infinite wisdom and he transcends our finite, limited capacity for
knowing.

 Shall the clay say to the potter, why did you make me like this"
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Rom. 9:20. This does not at all mean that one can hide Eehind the e[cuse of
mystery and duck the hard intellectual Tuestions. Indeed they are to Ee faced
with honesty and candor. But finite reason can only take us so far in developing
a thoughtful understanding of our faith. Reason reTuires us to admit that the
incomprehensive suffering of the world does call into Tuestion, from an e[isten
tialemotional standpoint, the e[istence of God.
In Dostoevsky
s The Brothers Karama]ov, Ivan challenges his Erother Alyosha:
Tell me, said Ivan earnestly, I challenge you᪽answer. Imagine that you
are creating a faEric of human destiny with the oEMect of making men
happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, Eut that it was essen
tial and inevitaEle to torture to death only one tiny creature᪽a
EaEy....would you consent to Ee the architect on those conditions" Tell me,
and tell the truth. No, I wouldn




In the final analysis, the proElem of evil poses insurmountaEle evidence
against faith in God᪽e[cept for one fact of history which disarms the attack of
our emotional and rational arguments. Taylor Caldwell has descriEed this fact
with therapeutic and theological insight in a Eook. The Listener, where she
descriEes a numEer of persons who pour out their souls to a man Eehind a cur
tain. Eventually these people come to a point of honesty in talking aEout their
grief and proElems and complain Eitterly against the universe. At that point, the
curtain opens and they see the Author of the universe, not standing idly Ey in
complacency, Eut crucified upon the Cross.
IS GOD-TALK HISTORICALLY DERI9ED"
It is apparent that Mackie did not know of the development of historical criti
cism in EiElical studies when he wrote: Although Christianity is said to Ee a his
torical religion, the 
historical
 claims especially aEout the life of Christ are not
treated as historical, Eecause Eelievers do not apply to them the sort of douEt
which would ordinarily apply to historical statements aEout any fairly remote
epoch.
 What is also apparent is that Mackie does not know that the develop
ment of modern critical history took its rise from within Christian theology and
critical EiEhcal studies. And the cutting edge in contemporary theology and
EiElical studies has Eeen an in-depth and proEing analysis of the rehaEility of
the historical events in the BiEle.
Through the modern development of the critical historical method, the histori
cal elements of the BiEle have Eeen suEMected to the most sever and painstaking
analysis of any document ever I am reminded of a statement Ey C. S. Lewis who
reported that, during his struggles to defend his atheism, it came as a shock when
the hardest Eoiled of all the atheists I ever knew sat in my room....and remarked
that the evidence for the historicity of the Gospels was really surprisingly
good. Of course, C. S. Lewis was led to a thoughtful analysis of the historical
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claims in the New Testament and Eecame a Christian. His classic treatment of the
miraculous foundation of Christian faith is contained in his Eook. Miracles. Here
he deals with all the philosophical issues and concludes that the primary issue
aEout the truth of Christian faith is historical, not merely philosophical.
The central New Testament declaration is that Jesus of Na]areth is the histori
cal appearance and personal emEodiment of God
s true Eeing. This self-revela
tion of God was made known Ey Jesus
 death and resurrection. The particularity
of this historical occurrence is the decisive meaning of Christian faith. Without it.
Christian faith would not e[ist. The decisive significance of this historical event
stands in sharp contrast to all other religions. )urther, the Christian attitude
toward the importance of historical events separates itself from all non-EiElical
religions which are, in essence, nature religions rather than historically-Eased
religions. BiElical scholarship has shown that there is a central core of inter-con
nected events Eeginning with AEraham and continuing down through the for
mation of the nation of Israel and culminating in the history of Jesus. This series
of events is called the history of salvation. This history contains a progressive
unfolding, developing, and enlightening view of God which reaches its highest
point in the declaration, Eased on his resurrection from the dead, that Jesus is the
Son of God.
Of course there are many parallels and similarities Eetween Christianity and
other religions. )rom the early centuries of the Christian faith, Eoth Christians
and non-Christians have noted these similarities. But there are radical difference
as well, and often the similarities are primarily superficial and shallow.
 The
really significant difference is the Christian attitude toward history. The
Christian faith cannot survive for a moment if its historical claims can Ee shown
to Ee false᪽or even proEaEly false. )or EiElical religion places a high premium
on rational evidence and reliaEle witnesses see  Corinthians 5. If the histori
cal nature of the apostolic claims aEout Jesus of Na]areth were shaky, then intel
lectual integrity and honesty would not allow us to Eelieve. This stands in radi
cal contrast to other religions for whom historical evidence is irrelevant. That is
why we refer to them as having a mythological Easis as opposed to the historical
Easis of Christian faith.
What aEout the historical evidence" Is it crediEle" ). ). Bruce, now retired pro
fessor of EiElical criticism at the University of Manchester, points out that the
evidence of our New Testament writings is ever so much greater than the evi
dence for many writings of classical authors, the authenticity of which no-one
dreams of Tuestioning. He goes on to point out that if the New Testament
were a collection of secular writings, their authenticity would generally Ee
regarded as Eeyond all douEt. Because the New Testament is a religious docu
ment, people are naturally suspicious of its claims and demand much more cor
roEorative evidence for such a work than they would for an ordinary secular or
pagan writing. However, Bruce points out, It is a curious fact that historians
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have often Eeen much readier to trust the New Testament records than have
many theologians. Why" Because of its reports aEout miracles. It is perhaps
only appropriate then that the most severe test of critical analysis ought to Ee
applied to the EiElical record. Bruce writes:
But we do not Tuarrel with those who want more evidence for the New
Testament than for other writings firstly, Eecause the universal claims
which the New Testament makes upon mankind are so aEsolute, and the
character and works of its chief )igure so unparalleled, that we want to Ee
as sure of its truth as we possiEly can and secondly, Eecause in point of
fact there is much more evidence for the New Testament than for other
ancient writings of comparaEle date.
To Ee sure, there are differing assessments among contemporary EiElical
scholars concerning the various historical elements in the BiEle. Many claims
and reports in the BiEle cannot Ee historically confirmed or disconfirmed. But
the main series of events which form the Easis of the history of salvation are
open to critical evaluation. It is true that some New Testament scholars do not
accept many of these central events as historically reliaEle accounts. Most
notaEle is Rudolf Bultmann. But at least Bultmann acknowledges that 
Corinthians was written Ey Paul around 55 A.D. and that it contains materials
which go Eack much further. He acknowledges that Paul really Eelieves that
Jesus was raised from the dead. He further acknowledged that the physical res
urrection of Jesus was really Eelieved to have happened Ey the earliest Christian
followers.
 Bultmann
s reMection of the resurrection is Eased on his e[istentialist
presupposition that assumes a fact-value dichotomy, as if empirical facts have
no Eearing on the ultimate meaning of life.
It is easily understandaEle, in the light of his espousal of the e[istentialist phi
losophy of Heidegger, that he would downgrade the importance of this histori
cal miracle. And it is unmistakaEly clear that Bultmann
s historical Mudgment
was Eiased against the empirical, historical evidence in favor of his philosophy
of e[istence. In this respect, HerEert Butterfield, the late professor of modern his
tory in the University of CamEridge, noted that the historicalcritical method
has often overstepped the Eounds of common sense as applied to EiElical
studies. The e[cessive skepticism as applied to the New Testament documents
Ey Bultmann led him to declare that the central events, though intended to Ee
historical reports Ey the earliest Christians, are really mythological Eecause of
the supernaturalism in which they are enmeshed.
 C. S. Lewis, one of the
world
s foremost scholars in mythology, comments that to him it is oEvious that
Bultmann does not understand the nature of myth. If the Gospels are myth, then
they are the most unimaginative and poorest kinds of myths which he has ever
read. Lewis writes:
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I myself, who first seriously read the New Testament when I was, imagina
tively and poetically, all agog for the Death and Re-Eirth patterns tof myth
ical religions@ and an[ious to meet a corn-king, was chilled and p u]]led
Ey the almost total aEsence of such ideas in the Christian documents. One
moment particularly stood out. A dying God᪽the only dying God who
might possiEly Ee historical᪽holds Eread, that is, corn, in His hand says,

This is my Eody.

Lewis shows that the mythologically-e[pressed desire to enMoy fellowship
with God as evidenced in all primitive religions of the world Eecomes a reality
in the history of Jesus Christ. The decisive difference is that the God of Jesus is
the God of nature and the God of history, and not a nature-god.
This historical Tuality permeates the EiElical documents. HerEert Butterfield
argues likewise for the inherently historical nature of the New Testament docu
ments. He writes: Of course there are some writings so clear in their integrity,
and so transparent in certain respects, that within their proper realm they could
almost Ee descriEed as carrying their own self-ratification with them and  think
that the Gospels. ...must Ee regarded as Eelongs to this class.

 Of course, in
spite of the way that these EiElical writings authenticate themselves instanta
neously in our minds, Butterfield points out that this is not in itself a sufficient
reason for accepting their accuracy from the standpoint of critical history.
 Yet,
the continuing developments in a critical interpretation of EiElical history in the
modern world further confirm its general reliaEility. In fact, the core events of
the history of salvation are so clearly discerniEle historically that it is usually
philosophical assumptions which produce a negative conclusion rather than the
empirical evidence.
Apparently Mackie was uninformed of the intensely critical scholarship
which has proEed the depth of this historical Tuestion. The fact that he can speak
of Jesus so unhistorically as Eeing in the same category as Osiris, Ashtaroth,
Dionysus, Baldur, 9ishnu and Amida reflects how uninformed he is of critical
historical matters.
 But this failure to understand the nature of the historical
Tuality of the BiEle is common among atheists. Kail Nielsen also reflects this
superficial understanding of the historical Tuality of Christian faith when he
writes: Why the BiEle rather than the Koran" Why the BiEle rather than the
canonical Buddhist te[ts" Why the BiEle rather than the Hindu te[ts" Why the
BiEle rather than the religious revelations of other people" If you look at religion





 In facL Nielsen says plainly that he cares nothing aEout the his
toricity of Jesus. No matter what the historical evidence is, there is apparently
nothing that would change his mind aEout the deity of Jesus.

One of the most proEing, critical, thorough and informing analysis of the evi
dence for Jesus
 resurrection as reported in the New Testament documents was
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made Ey one-time atheist, Wolfhart PannenEerg. In his Eook, Jesus᪽God and
Man, he argues with fairness and rational oEMectivity for the historicity of Jesus

resurrection. In a painstaking analysis of the evidence᪽and in dialogue with the
Eest of higher EiElical criticism which has left no stone unturned in its compre
hensive, critical analysis of the evidence᪽PannenEerg shows that the evidence
of Jesus
 resurrection from the dead is Eased on good historical foundations and
can Ee understood in continuity with the view of God as developed in the histo
ry of the nation of Israel. He e[amined the intelligiEility of the concept of the res
urrection itself as it was understood in poste[ilic Judaism.

Unfortunately, the most respected atheists in the English-speaking world
apparently have not critically e[amined the historical claims of the New
Testament. PannenEerg noted, in his discussions with Antony )lew
s atheism,
that there is a lack of sophistication in his way of dealing with the EiElical
reports. )lew had argued that in the case of something so unusual as a resur
rection from the dead that it reTuired evidence consideraEly stronger than ordi
nary events which we can e[perience through normal means. PannenEerg agreed
with his premise, and insisted that a critical e[amination of the evidence should
Ee persuasive. There are good and even superior reasons for claiming that the
Resurrection of Jesus was a historical event, and conseTuently the risen Lord him
self is a living reality.
 PannenEerg at the same time notes that )lew has a good
point that our e[perience reveals that dead men do not rise again. And so there is
a natural resistance to even consider the evidence for Jesus
 resurrection.
ConseTuently, the deEate will continue no matter what the evidence is.
᪽
It is generally assumed, especially in the European Continental discussion,
that the Tuestion of critical history and its relation to Christian faith was given
its classic formulation in the nineteenth century writings of Ernst Troeltsch.
Actually, the modern formulation of the critical historical Tuestion also goes
Eack to David Hume in Scotland in the eighteenth century. In An InTuiry
Concerning Human Understanding, Hume claims he discovered an argument
which will forever make it impossiEle for any thoughtful person to Eelieve in
miracles.

This argument which Hume develops and Mackie follows up on, articulates
some important points. )irsL our own personal e[perience is our only guide in
determining what is a true happening in the world. What is normal and custom
ary according to our own e[periences is the foundation for making Mudgments
concerning past events. Second, a thoughtful person will proportion their faith
to the evidence. There are degrees of proEaEility concerning what is to Ee
Eelieved, and we must critically assess all the known facts in estaEhshing what is
to Ee Eelieved.
In applying these principles, Hume e[plains that it is common and natural for
us to accept what someone else tells us aEout their past e[periences. We are Ey
nature inclined to tell the truth and our capacity to rememEer is tenacious. Of
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course, a person who is dehrious or noted for telhng falsehoods is easily discred
ited. But, generally speaking, we assume that people speak the truth, Hume
notes.
 What would cause us not to accept the testimony of someone" Only if
we were convinced, Eased on our own e[perience and oEservation, that the per
son was mistaken. There may Ee contrary testimony which would cause us to
Tuestion their report there may Ee serious Tuestions aEout the character of the
person their testimony may not Ee sufficiently corroEorated Ey other witnesses
the manner of their testimony may raise Tuestions they may not e[hiEit suffi
cient confidence in what they are reporting as a genuine happening they may
give the appearance of Eeing too confident in what they report. More specifical
ly, if their report contains e[traordinary or marvelous occurrences which are
counter to our own personal e[periences, then we rightly are suspicious of their
testimony. In these cases, we reTuire a more stringent proof and are inclined not
to Eelieve the report, since it would Ee contrary to customary e[periences.
But what aEout miracles" A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature,
Hume writes. By definition, Hume argues, a miracle is contrary to the uniform
e[perience of all people. Otherwise, it would not Ee called a miracle. It is no
miracle that a person should die suddenly, Eut it is a miracle that a dead man
should come Eack to life, if he really had died. Can such a report of a dead man
Eeing Erought Eack to life Ee accepted as a reliaEle testimony"
To answer this Tuestion, Hume says we must consider which alternative is the
more proEaEle. Is the testimony given Ey someone with such compelling integrity
that the likelihood of the testimony Eeing true is greater than the likelihood of the
event Eeing false" In other words, which would Ee the greater miracle᪽that the
witness is mistaken, or that the event really happened" If the falsehood of his
testimony would Ee more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and
not till then, can he pretend to command my Eelief or opinion.

This is the main argument against miracles and against the proEaEility that a
historical revelation of God could have occurred. It is this argument which Hume
says he flatters himself to have discovered.
 The laws of nature are Eased on
the principle of cause and effect. This principle is uniformly estaElished according
to our e[perience and oEservation. It would Ee a miracle if this law were inter
fered with and suspended. At the same time, if the report of a highly crediEle wit
ness is most unlikely to Ee false so that if the witness were mistaken it would con
stitute a miracle, then we have reached an impasse. At Eest there e[ists a mutual
destruction of arguments, so that one miracle cancels out the other.
A Still, then,
there is no Easis for Eelieving that a dead man can come Eack to life. To Ee sure,
Hume did allow that one could Ee e[pected to Eelieve in miracles if the falsehood
of a witness would Ee a greater miracle than the actual physical miracle itself Eut
he offers other supportive reasons why miracles are impossiEle which together
create an accumulative effect which makes it fairly certain that no witness could
Ee called forth to convince one of a miracle really happening.
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Mackie thinks Hume
s reasoning is conclusive. There is no way then to accept
the resurrection of Jesus there is no need to consider the proEaEilities of the
event since the most that could Ee e[pected to Ee derived out of a painstaking
critical analysis of the historical evidence would Ee an impasse.
What Mackie failed to reckon with is that, in spite of the numerous attempts
which have Eeen made to e[plain the miracle of the resurrection away, each
attempt has Eeen unconvincing. All critical scholarship accepts the fact that the
earliest disciples Eelieved that Jesus was physically raised from the dead, and no
e[planation Eesides the one given in the New Testament has Eeen successful in
determining why the disciples came to their conclusion.
In the nineteenth century, David Strauss pointed out that all attempts Ey theo
logically liEeral scholars to write a life of Jesus were failures Eecause their pre
sentations of Jesus were even less crediEle than the miraculous e[planation
given in the gospel. His own e[planation that the mythical thinking of the first-
century Eelievers is the Eest way to account for Jesus
 resurrection has also Eeen
discredited and makes the New Testament witness even more crediEle. )or as
Karl Jaspers has pointed out in discussions with Rudolf Bultmann, it is histori
cally inaccurate to Mudge the first-century as possessing a mythical mentality any
more than the modern world. They, too, knew that dead men did not rise
again.

Mackie fails to provide any further solution to this dilemma. It is perfectly in
order to try to e[plain the resurrection in a natural way, if that is what the evi
dence reTuires. To date, any e[planation for the Eelief of the earliest disciples in
Jesus
 resurrection has not Eeen forthcoming which carries any degree of credi-
Eihty other than the miraculous one provided Ey the witnesses of lesus.
᪽ That
is, the tradition of the empty tomE and the appearances of the risen Lord to the
disciples stand up historically to the most severe test which can Ee given Ey the
critical historical method, and Eelievers have sufficient and highly proEaEle rea
sons for affirming with intellectual integrity the historical foundation of their
faith. )or the self-revealing action of God in Jesus was not performed secretly in
a corner, Eut was done so puElicly that Paul was sure King Agrippa could have
e[amined the evidence for himself Acts 2:2. Likewise, we today have that
same opportunity.
We can say Yes to Hume, that Eased on the empirical evidence, along with the
crediEility of the original witnesses, it would Ee a greater miracle that the New
Testament witnesses were wrong than that the resurrection event itself actually
happened.
CONCLUSION
As we have noted, Mackie pursues Hume
s skepticism into a full-Elown athe
ism. The cumulative effect of all the non-deductive evidence, Mackie thinks, is
heavily weighted in favor of an atheistic position. The conclusion here is Must the
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opposite. It is my perception that the nature of Christian theism is rationally
coherent, ethically e[emplary, psychologically healthy-minded and historically
reliaEle and true. Each of us, of course, must make a decision for ourselves Eased
on the larger Eody of evidence. The finally convincing proof for a Christian
Eeliever, however, is to e[perience the life-transforming grace of God as mediat
ed through a personal relationship with the risen Lord  lohn 5:20. This is not a
mere pietistic platitude, Eut a frank acknowledgement that one must e[perience
the reality for oneself to know for sure.
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